At 0905, 41st Cavalry of the 11th Armored Division made contact with 41st Infantry of the 2nd Armored Division in Houffalie, thus terminating the Bastogne operation so far as the 3rd Army is concerned.
During the period of this operation, the 3rd Army utilized a total of 17 divisions and lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 24,598 men. In the same period the Germans utilized 20 divisions and lost a total of 18,051 in prisoners of war and enemy buried by us. Their estimated casualties, excluding non-battle, for this period amount to 103,900 as follows: 16,400 prisoners of war; 24,200 killed; 63,200 wounded. We believe that these figures are low.
On 18 December 1944 Army Engineer troops and supplies were massed behind the XII Corps prepared to support the main effort of the Third Army to breach the Siegfried Line in the Sarreguemines area. By 22 December 1944 these same Engineer troops were redisposed in an area extending from Luxembourg on the east to Virton on the west, operating in close support of two Corps on offensive assignments and one Corps on defensive assignments, and thousands of tons of bridging and demolitions were moving north and west to new supply dumps in the ESCH – ARLON area. From 22 December 1944 to 16 January 1945 more than 2800 miles of roads were reconnoitered and maintained. Continuous dense traffic, combined with drifting snows, made this task a gigantic one. During this same period, the installation and dismantling of roadblocks and tactical demolitions expended over 100,000 A.T. mines and 200,000 lbs of TNT. Bridging presented no problems in the initial phase of action, but toward the middle of January had again become a major function.
As of the 18th of December 1944, the major preponderance of 3rd Army ordnance troops, ammunition, and supplies, were concentrated on the Toul-Nancy-Sarreguemines axis to support the projected attack of the XII Corps.
With the change of direction of the attack to the north, all incoming ammunition was diverted to existing ASP’s in the LONGWY – ESCH area and new ASP’s established. By rail and truck companies an average of 4,500 tons of ammunition was moved per day, truck companies traveling in one week 462,000 miles in the hauling of ammunition alone. During this period – December 22nd to January 16th – the average consumption of ammunition per day in the Army area averaged 3,500 tons.
Maintenance requirements were met by moving ordnance units in coordination with the movement of combat units they had previously serviced. Replacement, new issue, and other ordnance supply issues were handled generally in the same manor as the ammunition supply, necessitating the movement of 45,000 tons of replacement equipment and spare parts, with the issue to troops during this period of 1,940 general purpose vehicles, 814 combat vehicles and 152 artillery weapons as replacements.
The fighting quality of American troops never reached a higher level than in this operation. Neither intolerable weather or the best troops in the possession of the Germans were able to stop them or prevent their supply.
G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding